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This special issue of the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies seeks to focus attention 
on the way in which race, racism, identity, nation and nationalism are articulated among 
scholars working on Turkish identity and nationalism.  Turkey provides an interesting site for 
investigation(s) on race, racism, nation and nationalism. On the one hand, it has a long 
history of many different ethnic and religious groups living together, side by side over 
centuries. On the other hand, Turkey is located in a peripheral location within Western 
hegemony and is portrayed in national mythology as a modern civic nation innocent of 
racism.  Many Turkish scholars claim that unlike German or Italian totalitarian nationalisms, 
Turkish nationalism is civic as under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Turkey adopted 
French nationalism exclusively based on citizenship.  According to this official view, the 
competing identities of Islam, Ottomanism and Turkism were resolved in favour of a peaceful 
and inclusive Turkish nationalism that was pieced together within the borders of the new 
republic.  
According to many critical scholars of nationalism, however, race and racism are essential 
factors of the process of national identity formation.  Some pointed out to strong key 
elements of racism in many forms of nationalism.1  Some others have contended that 
nationalism is a necessary condition for racism and that, in already constituted national states, 
nationalist movements inescapably camouflage racism. At the very least, one could expect 
that the nationalist sentiment, particularly when the nation is outlined in phenotypic, 
linguistic or religious terms, undoubtedly intersects with racism – in particular, with cultural 
racism.2  Many researchers of race, nation and identity draw attention to the fact that, in 
general, nationalism and racism are compellingly linked.   
 
  Nationalism is, on the other hand, a territorial concept. In a real sense, there is no 
nationalism without its claims to territoriality which distinguishes nation from ethnicity.  
Nationalism is an attempt to bridge the gap between nation and territory.  In essence, as a 
modern concept, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across territorial and political ones. 3 Nation building process, in 
this sense, a state driven process, particularly in the case of Turkey, whose markers of 
identity (such as language or religion) are frequently embedded in its official discourse, 
policies and legislation. Given that the racial component of Turkishness was weak in the 
multi-religious polity of the Ottoman Empire, the production of the nation as a racially and 
culturally homogenous unit since the beginning of the Turkish Republic has been mainly the 
task of the state rather than society. This is also enhanced by the fact that ‘the national 
struggle’ in Turkey was a racially defensive one with inclinations to produce and reproduce 
internal and external others to forge its culturally constructed racial identity. One must 
remember that the ‘national independence and identity was first achieved against the Greeks 
and Armenians who were not external and alien to the Ottoman identity and territories.  
 
Nationality is often thought of something ‘primordial’, ‘natural’ or pre-social. So, one may 
consider that Turks are different from Armenians in the way that the fish of the 
Mediterranean are different from those of the Black Sea.  This sense of ‘naturalness’ is 
reinforced by stories/ myths nations often have about their own past.  Nationalists often think 
of their nation in ways influenced by a traditional model of a pure or ideal case.  This ideal 
version is of people inhabiting a single, unified territory.  According to this view, the people 
are a kind of tribe.  They are also considered a single ethnic group with a common language, 
shared history, and common culture.  This culture may include shared religious beliefs as 
well.  Many of us care about what sort of people we are, and many of the characteristics we 
want to have are perceived as long-term.  And this may involve a long term process of self-
creation.   In a sense, constructing a national identity is a question of representing a particular 
‘uniqueness’ or a certain biological, cultural or religious ‘purity’, as a necessary cement for 
the preservation of national unity and harmony, and its protection against internal or external 
enemies. 
 
By way of Freud, nationalism can also be seen as a kind of ‘narcissism of minor differences’ 
that tends to essentialize the cultural, racial and ethnic differences where they may really not 
exist. As a racialized form of social identity, nationalism tends to infantilize the society. In 
the Turkish context, the umbilical cord between nation and state is traditionally strong and 
difficult to severe as the state acts as the father and the protector of the nation’s cultural/racial 
identity in its homogenized and purified forms against the external and internal threats. 
 
There are many different kinds of nationalisms and a number of different varieties of racisms.  
Even though there is a tendency among scholars to treat these terms in two separate 
compartments, the discourses of nationalism and racism are never very far apart.  In many 
cases, either nationalism invents race or racism invents nation so they are not, in essence, 
mutually exclusive.  There are essential continuities first of all because ways of thinking and 
of representation that are rooted in feeling of belonging, the image of community, and desire 
to present one’s own as unique and superior; but above all, because racism is not simply a 
psychological phenomenon, it always has an institutional racism which became an essential 
aspect of modern nation-sates from the start.   
 
The Turkish republic emerged, in its modern form, at the end of the First World War on the 
ruins of the defeated Ottoman Empire, as a state with a military backbone, possessed an 
official ideology—known as Kemalism after the leader of the Turkish independence war, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—committed to statism and a tight information policy and 
administered by a militantly secular small modernizing elite.   
 
From the start, the new Turkey identified itself directly and immediately with the history and 
culture of the Western world, claiming a total break with the Ottoman and Islamic past.  This 
was a period during which the new regime started to transform social and political life in 
Turkey with a number of significant steps such as the abolition of the Caliphate, and the 
introduction of the constitution proclaiming the new state as a Turkish state.  This was 
immediately followed by other laws which crushed the foremost expressions of Kurdish 
identity in the public sphere.4 
 
These events were seen as marking the beginning of a series of reforms that would shake the 
foundations of the country’s social and cultural life, and also played a significant role in 
shaping the way the identity of modern Turkey was constructed.  In particular, new laws and 
legislations about language, education and the judiciary aimed to create a uniform Turkish 
state.  Standard and secular education in Turkish as the official language deprived the Kurds 
of the most important means to preserve and maintain their cultural identity. The use of the 
Kurdish language was further limited by the judicial reforms. The Kurds had to use the 
official language in the new courts. These reforms also marked the beginning of the 
Turkification process, in other words the beginning of building a Turkish nation, based on the 
elements of the Turkish ethnicity, on the remains of what was left of the Ottoman Empire. 
The first Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, best expressed this grand aim in 1925: 
 
Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion.... In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of 
influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price and we will annihilate those who oppose the 
Turks or ‘le Turquism’.5 
 
In line with the general ‘scientific’ context existing in the late 19th and early 20th-century 
Europe, where the concept of race was a preoccupation for the growing human sciences, a 
number of so-called scientific researchers were involved in developing the concept of the 
Turkish race as the basis of white Aryan race.  To a large extent, this ‘scientific’ research 
strongly influenced Mustafa Kemal’s thinking when he initiated his version of Turkish-ness 
in the 1920s, with the grand design of providing some comfort and an extra boost for Turkish 
national pride and self-esteem which had been sadly undermined during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.   
In a state-sponsored systematic effort, missionary scientists were employed to prove the 
identicalness of the Turkish race and European ‘white’ race by verifying that ancient Turks 
were indeed the real ancestors of modern Aryan race(s). In doing so, a selective 
reconstruction of historical events took place in order to suppress the Ottoman past and 
pursue Kemalism’s specific political goal of providing a fresh new start under white 
European flag. The central theme of this process, constructing a new Turkish identity, was 
the rejection of the Ottoman-Islamic past by glorifying the – invented – pre-Islamic past of 
the Turks, and presenting it as the original source of all white Western superiority.   
At the beginning of the republican era, the nation-making project initiated / imposed by 
Mustafa Kemal and his close associates sought to create an ethnically homogeneous Turkey, 
a ‘pure Turkish Turkey’.  This was a painful and tragic period of Turkish history where even 
the slightest indication of dissent was suppressed violently.  A frank historical account of this 
crucial phase, of course, contradicts the most favoured story of the modern Turkish nation as 
a peacefully civic egalitarian society.  
It is now more than 90 years since the establishment of the Republic, but every Turkish child 
still grows up memorizing Ataturk’s 1927 address to the youth, which says ‘the noble blood 
in your veins’ and ‘how happy the one who says he is a Turk’. All primary and secondary 
schools still teach a ‘Turkish’ history that starts with the Huns of Central Asia, giving an 
exclusively ethnic, not civic, sense of a nation. Turkish nationalist demagogues, not 
necessarily only in the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), but even some leading members of 
the so-called social democratic main opposition party, Republican Peoples Party (CHP), still 
speak of ‘pure Turks’ in the country, clearly excluding the Kurds and all non-Muslims, and, 
recently sharply against (Muslim) Arabs, as the number of Syrian refugees increases fast in 
the country.6   
All this explains why a TV series and a cinema film based on the series, “The Valley of the 
Wolves”, that glorifies gun-toting nationalists who mow down their mainly Kurdish enemies, 
is by far the highest rating TV series and one of the highest box office returns in the history 
of Turkish TV and cinema. Even the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Bulent Arinc, 
described it in 2006 as ‘absolutely magnificent’ and ‘completely true to life’.7 
The articles published in this special issue cover many issues around race, racism, nation and 
national identity in Turkey.  Ilia Xypolia sets the scene by providing a detailed historical 
account of the racist aspects/ foundations of modern Turkish nationalism.  Tunc Aybak offers 
new insight into the Turkish state’s Armenian problem and the root causes of the denial.  Nil 
Mutluer’s article takes us to a discussion of the perceptions and treatment of Turkey’s Alevis 
by the state and Alevi responses to persecution and discrimination.  Mesut Yegen offers new 
understanding of Turkish left’s precarious approach to the Turkish state’s Kurdish question.  
Finally, reflecting on a comparison of Turkish and Greek national identities, Bulent Gokay 
and Lily Hamourtziadou demonstrate how race and otherness play a significant role in 
Turkish and Greek national identities.  
We are hoping that this special issue will inspire cross-national conversations on the ways in 
which the articulations of race, racism, national identity and nationalism are closely 
interconnected in the case of modern Turkey. An important question requiring closer 
examination concerns the modes by which race and racism have been mutually constituted 
through modernity, nation-state formation, and development along European lines. We are 
hoping that future critical scholarship on nationalism and identity in Turkey will incorporate 
an analysis of race and racism into their research.  And finally we are hopeful that this debate 
on the phenomenon of race and racism will lead us to rethink the articulation of Turkish 
nationalism and definition of citizenship in modern Turkey.  
Bulent Gokay and Tunc Aybak 
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